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Abstract: I argue that if we are Turing machines, as the 
Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) holds, then we are 
paraconsistent, i.e. we do not implement classical logic as 
canonical versions of the CTM generally hold (or assume). I 
then show that this claim presents a serious challenge to the 
Lucas-Penrose argument (Lucas 1961, Penrose 1989, 94), as it 
collapses Lucas-Penrose into a disjunction (in a manner 
reminiscent of Benacerraf's (1967) famous objection to Lucas-
Penrose). Specifically, whereas Lucas-Penrose concludes that 
we are not Turing machines, I show that the most one can 
conclude from the argument is that either we are not Turing 
machines or we are Turing machines implementing a non-
classical logic. 
In 'Minds, Machines and Gödcl,' J.R. Lucas (1961) put forth 
an argument against any mechanistic theory of mind that attempts 
to equate the human brain with a Turing machine (TM). Roughly, 
Lucas reasoned: (1) no consistent formal system (or TM 
implementing a formal system) can decide the Gödcl sentence ('I 
am not provable'), (2) the human mind can decide the Gödel 
sentence (i.e. we can look and see the truth of the sentence), 
therefore (3) the human mind cannot be a TM. Lucas' argument 
remains relevant—and continues to generate debate—as: (1) it can be 
taken as an attack on the enormously influential Computational Theory 
of Mind (CTM), and (2) Lucas' argument has been revived, defended 
and expanded in two recent books by R. Penrose (1989,94). 
Here, I argue that if we are in fact TMs, we implement a 
paraconsistent logic, and not a classical logic (FOL), as canonical 
versions of the CTM generally hold (or implicitly assume). I show 
that simply raising this possibility is enough to defeat Lucas' 
attempt to respond to Putnam's (1960,95) devastating criticism of 
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Lucas-Penrose (L-P). Even worse for L-P, the possibility that we 
are paraconsistent entails that the most that we can conclude from 
L-P is that either (1) we are not TMs or (2) we are able to see the 
truth of the G. sentence because we are paraconsistent TMs (as a 
paraconsistent TM would be able to decide the G. sentence). That 
is, raising the possibility that we are paraconsistent is sufficient to 
collapse Lucas-Penrose into a disjunction (so this criticism is at 
least as severe as Benacerraf's (1967) famous objection to L-P, 
which also collapses L-P into a disjunction). 
First, I offer a very brief introduction to paraconsistent logic, 
before arguing that we are in fact paraconsistent. Then, I show 
how the possibility that we are paraconsistent serious undermines 
L-P. 
Paraconsistent Logic 
Paraconsistent logic - unlike classical logic - denies that anything 
follows from a contradiction. That is, in paraconsistent logic, the 
inference from p and ~p to any q is blocked. Classical systems, if 
inconsistent, collapse into a useless heap; if any q can be deduced 
in a system the system is essentially useless. Paraconsistent 
systems, however, can allow for a contradiction and still remain 
useful, as the contradiction cannot be used to infer anything. In 
short, a paraconsistent approach prevents a contradiction from 
infecting an entire system. (For an introduction to paraconsistent 
logic see Priest, Routley and Norman (1989), Priest and Tanaka 
(1996), or Priest forthcoming.) 
Relevance logic is the most well-known, developed and 
discussed type of paraconsistent logic. In addition to rejecting the 
inference from p and ~p to any q, relevance logic also rejects the 
two other 'paradoxes of strict implication' ((/? —> (tf -» tf) and p —» 
(q -» p)) and the 'paradoxes of material implication' ((p -» (q —» 
p)), -~p —> (q -> q) and (p -> q) v (q -» r)). The motivation for 
relevance logic is a belief that classical logic allows for 'fallacies 
of relevance.' That is, classical logic unjustly neglects the actual 
relationship between antecedent and consequent (and premise and 
conclusion), a circumstance that allows for 'dubious' inferences 
where the antecedent seems irrelevant to the consequent, such as 
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'My feet arc cold, therefore, if there is someone at the door then 
my feet are cold.' (For an introduction to relevance logic, see Mares 
(1998); see Anderson and Belnap (1975) for the canonical 
formulation of relevance logic.) 
Paraconsistent logic has numerous interesting philosophical 
implications. One such implication is the following: paraconsistent 
logic would be one way of overcoming the limitations of the formal 
method when it comes to attempted formalizations of arithmetic 
insofar as it might be possible to prove the Gödel sentence in a 
paraconsistent system (see Priest 1996, for example). In a classical 
system, if the Gödel sentence is provable, then the system is 
inconsistent, and if the system is consistent, then the Gödel sentence 
is not provable (though it is true, hence the system is incomplete). 
But for paraconsistent systems, the threat of inconsistency is no 
longer a threat, a circumstance that implies that 'the Gödel sentence 
may well be provable ' (Priest 1996) in a paraconsis tent 
formalization. 
Are We Paraconsistent? 
I wish to raise the following possibility: if we arc in fact TMs (as 
the CTM holds), we do not implement classical logic, as canonical 
versions of CTM argue or assume; rather, we arc paraconsistent. 
(For the principle formulations and defenses of the CTM, see 
Putnam (1960, 67), Fodor (1975, 81, 87, 90, 93) and Pylyshyn 
(1980, 94), for example.) As I now argue, there are several good 
reasons for suspecting that we utilize paraconsistent reasoning, 
which implies that if we are in fact TMs, then we implement a 
paraconsistent logic. 
The first issue I discuss concerns the frame problem. Recall 
Dennett's (1984) diagnosis of the multi-faceted frame problem. A 
series of robots (Rl , R1D1, R2D1) are faced with the following 
scenario: safely retrieve your batteries from a room in which a 
ticking bomb is also placed. One of the robots (Rl D1) is blown up 
because it takes too long calculating irrelevant details and 
implications of its actions, such as 'pulling the wagon out of the 
room (will) not change the color of the room's walls' (Dennett 
1984). That is, one aspect of the frame problem concerns the 
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question as to how we instinctively seem to focus on the more 
relevant implications of our acts, and how we can program an 
'intelligent' robot to do the same. 
Further, recall that relevance logic—the most prominent form 
of paraconsistent logic—is motivated by a desire to eliminate 
'fallacies of relevance.' The implication is: if we do in fact 
implement some type of relevance logic, then this might explain 
why we don't suffer from this aspect of the frame problem, i.e. 
this might account for how we naturally ignore irrelevant 
consequences of our actions when attempting to determine the 
consequences of our act ions. This result should not be 
underestimated: the frame problem is a tremendous difficulty facing 
not only Symbolic Artificial Intelligence but cognitive science as 
well. As Fodor (2000, p. 42) states, 'the frame problem is a lot of 
what makes cognition so hard to understand...cognitive science 
minus the frame problem is Hamlet without anybody much except 
Polonius.' If the possibility that we are paraconsistent can help 
unravel the frame problem, then the possibility that we are 
paraconsistent should be taken seriously. 
It seems to be a brute fact of our cognitive lives that our 
reasoning does not generally or systematically contain inferences 
such as: 'My feet are cold, therefore, if there is someone at the 
door then my feet are cold.' If our reasoning had no concern for 
relevance, it is hard to see how we could function properly. Of 
course, there might be exceptions: it could be argued that sometimes 
we do make dubious inferences such as 'I won the game because I 
wore my lucky hat,' but even this example can be interpreted as 
being a case of misplaced relevance, as opposed to a lack of 
relevance. 
To continue, Priest (see (1996), for instance) points out that 
there are numerous examples of inconsistent scientific theories. 
An example is Bohr's theory of the atom: Bohr's theory states that 
'an electron orbits the nucleus of the atom without radiating energy,' 
while Maxwell's equations, which play an important role in Bohr's 
theory, state that 'an electron which is accelerating in orbit must 
radiate energy' (Priest 1996). As 'not everything concerning the 
behavior of electrons was inferred' from the inconsistent theory, 
i.e. as not every q was inferred from the theory, Bohr must have 
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used paraconsistent reasoning (Priest 1996). If one combines the 
insight that some scientific theories are inconsistent with a belief 
that we are TMs, one must conclude that we are paraconsistent 
TMs. 
The phenomenon of belief revision also suggests that we use 
paraconsistent reasoning (see Restall and Slaney (1995), and Priest 
(1996)). We believe something because we think it true, yet, 
humbly, we do allow for the possibility that at least one of our 
beliefs could be—and probably is—false; if we didn't allow for 
this possibility, it's hard to see how belief revision would even be 
possible (as we would never reject a held belief as false). The so-
called 'paradox of the preface' captures this idea somewhat: 'a 
rational person, after thorough research, writes a book in which 
they claim A,.... A n , ' yet, the author is aware that 'no book of any 
complexity contains only truths' (Priest 1996), i.e. they also 
rationally assert not A, An. In short, it appears that we must be 
paraconsistent to allow for the phenomenon of belief revision, and 
if one holds that we are paraconsistent, then the paradox of the 
preface dissolves. 
Finally, I point out that I am making a purely descriptive, as 
opposed to a normative, claim. I am simply claiming that we arc in 
fact paraconsistent, and I leave questions as to whether or not we 
should reason in the manner that we do to the side as irrelevant to 
my thesis. 
Implications for Lucas-Penrose 
The claim, or even merely the possibility, that we are paraconsistent 
has serious implications for L-P; here, I briefly point out two. First, 
Lucas' attempt to respond to Putnam's (1960,95) classic criticism 
of L-P fails. Second, and more seriously, L-P is collapsed into a 
disjunction, and hence prevented from reaching its desired 
conclusion. 
As is well known, H. Putnam (1960,95) put forth what is generally 
recognized as the most serious objection to L-P; S. Guccione (1993, 
p.62), for instance, calls Putnam's criticism the 'most conclusive 
and immediate objection' to L-P. Putnam's (1960, 95) criticism 
can be summarized in the following manner: 
28 AUSLEGUNG 
(1) Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem only applies to 
consistent formal systems. 
(2) Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem establishes that 
one cannot establish the consistency of a formal system 
from within the system itself, so 
(3) If we are TMs, we can never establish our own consistency 
(and cannot, therefore, confidently apply Gödel's First 
Theorem to ourselves, i.e. L-P is a nonstarter). 
Lucas has attempted to meet Putnam's (1960, 95) objection by 
pointing out that if we were inconsistent, we'd assert any random 
q (as any q can be inferred in a contradictory system). Since we 
don't assert any random q, we must be consistent, that is, here we 
have a consideration that can establish our consistency and thereby 
overcome Putnam's objection to L-P. 
Now, as I pointed out in the previous section, one cannot infer 
any q in paraconsisent systems. If, as I argued above, we are 
paraconsistent, then we would have an alternative explanation for 
why we don't assert any q from the one Lucas puts forth. In effect, 
Lucas' attempt to overcome Putnam's devastating criticism is 
inadequate, or at least inconclusive, given the possibility that we 
are paraconsistent. 
But, the possibility that we are paraconsistent raises an even 
more serious problem for L-P. Recall that in paraconsistent systems, 
it may very well be possible to prove the G sentence. If one carries 
this insight over into the context of the debate surrounding L-P, 
one sees that a possible explanation for why we can decide the G. 
sentence is that we are paraconsistent TMs, and not, as L-P argues, 
that we are not TMs at all. In short, L-P holds that we are not TMs 
because we can decide the G. sentence while no TM can, but if 
one allows for the possibility that we are paraconsistent, one sees 
that the most L-P can conclude from the realization that we can 
decide the G. sentence is the following disjunction: either we can 
decide the G. sentence because we are not TMs or we can decide 
the G sentence because we are paraconsistent TMs. 
As is well-known, Benacerraf's (1967) famous objection to 
L-P pursued a similar strategy, i.e. Benacerraf also collapsed L-P 
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into a disjunction. This suggests that perhaps this novel objection 
is at least as serious as Benacerraf's (1967) objection. 
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